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Positive Education Federalism:
The Promise of Equality after the
Every Student Succeeds Act
by Christian B. Sundquist*
INTRODUCTION

The accepted narrative of the American public education system is one
of decline, educational "crisis,"' and systemic failure. Our public schools
2
increasingly are segregated by race and class in the post-Brown era,
while fundamental social inequalities persist among schools in regards
to educational quality, financing, and outcomes. Long viewed as essential to the economic and democratic development of America's citizenry,
our unequal system of universal public education has forsaken the "faces
at the bottom of [the] well" in an era of deregulation and decreased social
welfare funding. 3

* Professor of Law and Director of Faculty Research and Scholarship, Albany Law
School. Carleton College (BA., 1997); Georgetown University Law Center (J.D., 2002). The
Author would like to thank the faculty affiliates of the Institute for Research on Poverty at
the University of Wisconsin-Madison ("UW-Madison") for their assistance in framing the
ideas for this Article. I am also grateful to Professors Linn Posey-Maddox and Bianca
Baldridge of the Educational Policy Studies department at UW-Madison for providing useful feedback on federal education policy.
1. Remarks by U.S. Deputy Secretary Tony Miller at The Church of God in Christ's
InternationalAIM Convention in Houston, Texas, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. (July 7, 2011), avail("[W]e recognize
able at http://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/partnering-education-reform
that if we are to successfully address the crisis confronting our education system, then the
change that's happening every day in pockets of promise nationwide needs to not only continue but to grow.").
2. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM
v (1992) ("Black people are the magical faces at the bottom of society's well. Even the poorest whites, those who must live their lives only a few levels above, gain their self-esteem by
gazing down on us. Surely, they must know that their deliverance depends on letting down
their ropes. Only by working together is escape possible. Over time, many reach out, but
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The federal government previously responded to the failure of Brown's
promise of equal educational opportunity by introducing legislation-the
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB)4 and the Race to the Top Act
of 2009 (RTT)--that promoted educational reform informed by the classic market principles of consumer choice, competition, and accountability. Under this schema, the failure of America's public schools could be
traced to an overregulation of education that has promoted bureaucratic
stasis, ineffective teaching, and unaccountability at the cost of the individual liberty of parents and children to attend the school of their choice.
The role of the federal government, then, was to utilize its fiscal block
grant-in-aid powers to cultivate the private and market-based properties
of public education.
The well-documented failures of the NCLB and RTT to promote student achievement, much less equality in education, led Congress to pass
the Every Student Succeeds Act in December of 2015 (ESSA).6 The bipartisan ESSA has been hailed by both liberal and conservative education reformers for not only superseding the much-reviled NCLB and RTT
framework, but also for shifting control over certain aspects of public education policy to state and local actors.
The new education act nonetheless largely leaves untouched the substantive framework of NCLB and RTT. The ESSA retains the core focus
of the past education framework in its continued emphasis on promoting
student achievement through consumer choice, accountability, highstakes testing, and inter-school competition. If anything, the ESSA has
broadened the market-based approach of federal education policy by
shifting the responsibility for employing corporate measures of accountability to states (themselves serving as "laboratories of experimentation"
subject to market demands).
And yet the crisis of America's system of public education is less a
manifestation of under-incentivized schools, inadequate school choice,
and poor teaching, than it is a reflection of unrelenting poverty and persistent racial discrimination. The modeling of education policy and law
around the oft-criticized market assumptions of consumer choice, competition, and accountability have led to a deepening of the crisis confronting
public schools. Since the adoption of market-based education legislation

most simply watch, mesmerized into maintaining their unspoken commitment to keeping
us where we are, at whatever cost to them or to us.").
4. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified as amended scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
5. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§ 1400514006, 123 Stat. 115, 282-84 (2009).
6. Every Student Succeeds Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015).
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such as NCLB and RTT in the last ten years, our public schools have been
re-segregating at an accelerated rate and the achievement gaps between
the rich and poor, and white and non-white have deepened. 7
The market model of public education preserved through the new
ESSA legislation does not provide answers to our current educational dilemma, but the model merely deflects the responsibility of providing an
equitable public education from the public sphere of federal and state
government to the private sphere. There are no easy answers to the public school crisis, and simply incorporating misplaced assumptions of competition, rational choice, and market accountability into public educational policy will not resolve the situation. We need to acknowledge that
our school failures are not due to the absence of market incentives and
processes in education, but are caused by systemic social inequalities-including poverty, racial discrimination and segregation, unequal
school financing, and inadequate teacher compensation.
On the heels of the recent passage of the ESSA, this Article examines
the appropriate federal role in developing and enforcing public educational policy and law. "Our federalism"8 demands not only that there be
an appropriate balance between state and federal power when evaluating
the constitutional feasibility of new laws, but also that there remain a
sufficient demarcation between the public and private spheres of regulation. This Article argues that the existing market-oriented statutory approach to public education, as embodied by the ESSA, fails to advance
the values of education federalism by encouraging the penetration of private market forces into the traditionally public sphere of universal education.
Part I of this Article explores traditional conceptions of federalism as
a negative limit on the executive, legislative, and judicial power of the
federal government. This section identifies the core values associated
with such conceptions of "negative federalism," while criticizing negative
models as unprincipled and indeterminate. Part II examines the civic
model of public education that pre-dated current education policy, while
charting the historical expansion of the federal role in public education.
This section argues that the values informing the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), 9 as influenced by the Brown v. Board of
Educationo United States Supreme Court decision, recognize the important governmental role in maintaining educational equality. Part III

7.
U. L.J.
8.
9.
10.

Wendy Parker, From the Failure of Desegregation to the Failure of Choice, 40 WASH.
& POL'Y 117, 145 (2012).
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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analyzes the current federal role in public education under the traditional negative model of federalism. This section argues that a competitive view of federalism has come to influence public education policy in
the modern era, whereby the appropriate role of government has come to
be seen as one that promotes market competition. As a result, the original de-segregative and equalizing dimension of education federalism envisioned by the ESEA and Brown has been forsaken. Finally, Part IV
advances an alternative positive conception of education federalism,
which stresses the obligation of the federal government to address failures in the system of public education in a manner that accords with
principles of social justice and democratic equality. This section then develops substantive policy principles to guide future reauthorizations of
federal education law.
I. ON FEDERALISM, STATE SOVEREIGNTY, AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY

The development of the American system of federalism has been influenced by constitutional structure, judicial interpretation, and political
advocacy. Our Constitution establishes a federalist system of governance, with the country's constitutional responsibilities towards its citizens divided between a single national government and multiple state
governments. At its most basic and descriptive level, the concept of
American federalism is thus quite easy to understand: it refers generally
to a theory of political governance that divides power between a large,
centralized state and smaller, localized political units.
The inherent complexity of federalism becomes apparent, however,
when one attempts to define the boundaries of power between the central
government and its constituent states. An array of legal and political
theories have been advanced to resolve questions regarding the appropriate federal and state roles in dealing with social problems such as public
education, including the concepts of cooperative federalism, dual federalism, and competitive federalism. While quite different in many respects,
an important common feature of traditional theories of federalism is that
they prescribe a negative vision of the limits and boundaries of government action. The concept of federalism, then, is most often invoked to
provide a constitutional basis for limiting the ability of one level of government (typically the federal government) to respond to matters of great
social concern.
A. TraditionalTheories of Federalism
A variety of related visions of negative federalism have impacted the
development of public education policy. The theory of dual federalism
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resounds in much of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, and dual federalism is invoked principally to invalidate federal legislative action" and
prevent federal judicial review of alleged constitutional deprivations. 12
This conception of federalism stresses the independent sovereignty of
states as a constitutional barrier to certain federal actions. Under this
view of the zones of state and federal sovereignty, state governments occupy an exclusive sphere of authority that is completely independent
from that of the national government. Justice David Brewer described
such an approach to federalism:
We have in this Republic a dual system of government, National and
state, each operating within the same territory and upon the same persons; and yet working without collision, because their functions are
different. There are certain matters over which the National Government has absolute control and no action of the State can interfere
therewith, and there are others in which the State is supreme, and in
respect to them the National Government is powerless. To preserve
the even balance between these two governments and hold each in its
separate sphere is the peculiar duty of all courts . .. 13
Dual federalism dominated the rights-restrictive jurisprudence of the
early twentieth century Supreme Court before losing ground to a broader
conception of the federal government's authority to regulate under the
Commerce Clause1 4 during the progressive era of the New Deal. The Supreme Court shifted its view of federalism during the New Deal era from
one characterized by strict, separate spheres of national and state authority to one that acknowledged that national and state authority were
largely concurrent. 15 Justice Hugo Black, writing for the majority in the
16
seminal case Younger v. Harris,
has conceived of cooperativefederalism
as requiring:
a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both
State and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights

11. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
12. Younger, 401 U.S. at 52.
13. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905) (providing a synopsis of
the dual federalist view of government).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
15. See Edward S. Corwin, The Passingof Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REv. 1, 17 (1950).

16. 401 U.S. 37 (1981).
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and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not
7
unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.'
The cooperative or concurrent view of federalism "requires that Congress treat the States in a manner consistent with their status as residuary sovereigns and joint participants in the governance of the Nation,"18
and has been relied on by the Court to both invalidate federal legislation19 and prevent federal judicial review 20 where such actions might impinge upon legitimate state interests. As such, this framework-envisioning a shared regulatory authority between the federal and state
governments-remains a negative conception of the boundaries of federal
authority.
A reformed version of dual federalism was espoused by the Rehnquist
Court during the 1990s. During this period, the Court sharply distinguished between "what is truly national and what is truly local." 2 1 In
United States v. Morrison,22 for example, the Supreme Court invalidated
the civil remedy provision of a federal statute, the Violence Against
Women Act of 1994 (VAWA),23 on grounds that the federal action attempted to regulate non-economic and local conduct. 24 The Rehnquist
Court also strained to restrict federal authority to subject states to civil
litigation 25 and to control state governmental operations on dual federalism grounds. 26 The Court made the following clear in Printz v. United
States: "The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring
the States to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program . . . such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty." 27

17. Id. at 44.
18. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999).
19. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Am. Trucking Ass'ns v.
EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Frank v. United States, 78 F.3d 815 (2d Cir. 1995).
20. See, e.g., Younger, 401 U.S. at 44; Condon v. Reno, 528 U.S. 141 (2000); West Virginia v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Serv., 289 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2002); Nat'l Fed'n of
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
21. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000).
22. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).

23. 42 U.S.C.

§ 13981 (2012).

24. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626-27.
25. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996) ("Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete lawmaking authority over a particular area, the Eleventh
Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting States.").
26. Printz, 521 U.S. at 921-22.
27. Id. at 935.
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An alternative conception of the nature of our system of governance,
embodied by the theory of dynamic federalism, provides for an overlapping distribution of authority between national and state governments.
Rather than focusing solely on the cooperative aspects of federal-state
interaction, the dynamic federalism model recognizes that there exists
"multiple, independent sources of political authority." 28 Under this view,
"[n]either the federal government nor the states can eliminate the independent lawmaking authority of the other." 29

Negative models of federalism cite a litany of constitutional values
that are promoted by limiting federal authority, such as (a) reducing the
likelihood of federal governmental tyranny, (b) promoting state experimentation, (c) protecting individual liberty, (d) preserving the "original
meaning" of the Constitution, (e) enhancing democratic processes, and (f)
fostering competition and choice. 30 Nonetheless, as Erwin Chemerinsky
has documented, the oft-stated values of traditional conceptions of federalism tend to bear little relation to judicial decision-making. 31 The inherent indeterminacy of traditional federalism jurisprudence can be explained by the common observation that "federalism is consistently. ..
employed [by courts] only derivatively, as a tool to achieve some other
ideological end, rather than as a principled end in and of itself." 32 Empirical studies of U.S. Supreme Court decisions have borne out this observation, confirming that political ideology is strongly associated with
case outcomes in the federalism context.33 Traditional conceptions of negative federalism have thus historically inhibited the ability of the federal

28. Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV.
243, 285 (2005).
29. Id. at 286.
30.

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,

ENHANCING GOVERNMENT:

FEDERALISM FOR THE 21st

CENTURY 99, 114 (2008); see Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Evolving UnderstandingsofAmerican
Federalism:Some Shifting Parameters,50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 635, 687 (2005).
31. CHEMERINSKY, supranote 30, at 116 (analyzing how Supreme Court decisions have
historically borne little to "no relationship to the underlying values of federalism"). Id.
32. Frank B. Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304, 1307 (1999).
As Anthony D'Amato asserts, judges have a tendency to couch their "personal legislative
preferences ... in the publicly venerated language of a judicial decree." Anthony D'Amato,
Aspects of Deconstruction: Refuting Indeterminacy with One Bold Thought, 85 NW. U. L.
REV. 113, 118 (1990).
33. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Elastic Commerce Clause: A
Political Theory of American Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1396 (1994); Sue Davis,
Rehnquist and State Courts: FederalismRevisited, 45 W. POL. Q. 773 (1992); Charles Wise
& Rosemary O'Leary, Intergovernmental Relationsand Federalismin Environmental Management and Policy: The Role of the Courts, 57 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 150 (1997).
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government to promote educational equality and respond to racial dis34
crimination in public education.
B. The Substance of Federalism
Traditional models of federalism are typically regarded as being primarily procedural and structural in nature: given the federalist structure
of our government, certain actions are simply within the sole province of
states. Under this perspective, courts mechanically apply the federalism
doctrine to cleanly demarcate the appropriate spaces of federal and state
control. Negative models of federalism, however, also have a substantive
dimension-whereby judicial decision-making and legislative policy are
shaped by values in divining when it is appropriate for the federal gov35
The principal norm advanced
ernment to respond to social inequality.
by the Court under traditional conceptions of federalism is the "protection[] of liberty." 36 Our history ironically demonstrates, however, that
negative conceptions of federalism informed by "liberty" have typically
been wielded by the Court to limit the protection of constitutional rights
37
Indeed, the liberty cited by past prowhile invalidating federal action.
ponents of negative federalism has often been of states to preserve sys38
tems of racial control.
C. Competitive Federalism
The dualist, cooperative, and dynamic conceptions of federalism represent related visions of when federal authority must be abrogated in order to protect state sovereignty. And yet not all classic theories of negative federalism are designed around competing procedural notions of

34. Cumming v. Bd. of Educ. of Richmond Cty., 175 U.S. 528, 545 (1899); Gong Lum v.
Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 85-86 (1927); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 44
(1973).
35. See CHEMERINSKY, supranote 30, at 4.
36. Printz, 521 U.S. at 921 ("This separation of the two spheres is one of the Constitution's structural protections of liberty."); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552
(1995) ("This constitutionally mandated division of authority 'was adopted by the Framers
to ensure protection of our fundamental liberties."'); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458
(1991) ("Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal
Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a
healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the
risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.").
37. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 933; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 106-08; see also Erwin
Chemerinsky, Does Federalism Advance Liberty?, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 911, 913 (2001)
("[Olverwhelmingly, the Supreme Court's federalism decisions are 'rights regressive'- that
is, they limit rather than enhance individual liberties.").
38. See infra Part II.
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state sovereignty. The model of competitive federalism, for instance, asserts that the core substance of "American federalism" is the protection
of markets. Most proponents of a market-based conception of federalism
argue in some form that "governmental competition . . . is central to the
U.S. Constitution," 39 thus providing "the political foundation of markets." 4 0 A market-based understanding of federalism is appropriate, according to proponents, as the Founders sought to "emphasize competition
between states and the federal government" through the Constitutional
structure and a focus on protecting individual liberty. 41 The "essence of
federalism" under this view is to provide "a sustainable system of political decentralization." 42 Adherents believe that "by harnessing competition among jurisdictions, federalism secures in the political arena the advantages of economic markets-consumer choice and satisfaction,
43
innovation, superior products at lower prices."
The model of competitive federalism, then, seeks to promote a deregulated "free market" at both the state and federal level through incorpora44
tion of the economic principles of consumer choice and competition.
Such a view necessarily assumes that "individuals [are] self-seeking and
utility-maximizing actors with highly varied preferences and that the
proper function of government was to protect their freedom to seek satisfaction of those diverse preferences."4 5 As such, competitive federalism is
as concerned with the federal-state relationship as it is with the distinction between public and private spaces.
The current regulatory structure in public education has been greatly
influenced by such notions of competitive federalism. As will be discussed in more detail in Part III of this Article, the legislative histories

39. John D. Donahue, Tiebout? Or Not Tiebout? The Market Metaphor and America's
Devolution Debate, 11 J. EcON. PERSP. 73, 74 (1997).
40. Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of PoliticalInstitutions:Market-Preserving
Federalismand Economic Development, 11(1) J.L. EcON. & ORG. 1, 2 (1995).
41.

MICHAEL S. GREVE, REAL FEDERALISM: WHY IT MATTERS, How IT COULD HAPPEN

18-25, 1112 (1999) (arguing that federalism jurisprudence became distorted during the New
Deal era in that it moved away from its constitutional beginnings as a mechanism to ensure
government competition, and towards a process-oriented version that focused on state sovereignty).
42. Weingast, supra note 40, at 4.
43. GREVE, supra note 41, at 3.
44. Id. at 2 (arguing that the values of "competitive federalism are choice and competition"); see Donahue, supranote 39, at 74; Craig Volden, The Politicsof Competitive Federalism: A Race to the Bottom in Welfare Benefits?, 46(2) AM. J. POL. Sci. 352, 360 (2002)
(arguing that "one significant aspect of American federalism is competition among the
states"); F.E. Guerra-Pujol, Coase and the Constitution:A New Approach to Federalism, 14
RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 593 (2011).
45. Purcell, supra note 30, at 687.
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of both Acts demonstrate that the intent of Congress was to promote educational "reform" through deregulation and privatization. The appropriate federal role in public education under this competitive federalist
viewpoint, then, is to allow free market forces the opportunity to restructure education through enhanced competition, accountability, and consumer choice.46 That is, the proper federal role under this schema is to
redirect responsibility for public education from the public government
to private market forces.
This Article focuses less on the procedural dimension of federalism
(the vertical relationship of authority between the states and the national
government), and more on the substantive dimension of federalism.
Within the context of public education, this Article argues that education
federalism has substantively incorporated classic market economic principles to guide the proper allocation of power between the federal and
state governments. This Article will show that this focus on economic
principles is misplaced, as the substance of education federalism remains
rooted in a Brown era understanding of class and racial equality.
FEDERALISM AND THE CIVIC MODEL OF PUBLIC EDUCATION

II.

Our history of using negative federalism to constrain the federal role
in public education has coincided with our enduring efforts to normalize
social inequality. American society has long struggled with reconciling
the dilemma borne from ascribing to liberal equality in the face of persistent and unrelenting social inequality. Previously, I have summarized
the following:
The call for universal rights by non-propertied social classes clashed
with the strong bourgeoisie notions of capitalism and the free market
that displaced the old order of monarchy and feudalism. The inherent
inequality that stemmed from the private ownership of property led
Adam Smith and other thinkers to believe that there had to be limits
and exceptions to "universal equality" in order to protect the "natural"
rights of propertied classes ... Early theories of "race" [and other notions of difference] . . . filled the void left by feudal hierarchy in explaining class distinctions, and reconciled the unequal treatment of
certain groups of people with liberalism's embrace of universal equal47

ity.

46. See infra Part III.
47. Christian B. Sundquist, The Meaningof Race in the DNA Era:Science, History and
the Law, 27 TEMP J. Sci. TECH. & ENvTL. L. 231, 238 (2008).
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The following variety of artifices have historically been used to rationalize this long-standing contradiction of American democracy: 48 the de50
velopment of biological race theory, 49 the construction of gender, culture
51
of poverty theories, and the normalization of poverty as caused by either
a neutral market, cultural forces, or both.52 The equality dilemma of
American democracy has consequently been rationalized on grounds of
purported difference (cultural or biological), which allowed inequality to
become viewed by many as a naturally occurring consequence of a market
economy. Through this process of normalizing privilege, federal govern54
mental action has typically been deemed unnecessary, 53 ineffective, or
55
improper to respond to issues of social inequality (including educational
inequity).
A. The Early FederalRole in Public Education:Individualism and the

48. See generallyGUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND
MODERN DEMOCRACY (1944).
49. Sundquist, The Meaning of Race, supranote 47; Christian B. Sundquist, Genetics,
Race and Substantive Due Process, 20 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 341 (2014);
Christian B. Sundquist, Science Fictions and Racial Fables:Navigating the Final Frontier
of Genetic Interpretation,25 HARv. BLACKLET1ER J. 57 (2009).
50. See, e.g., Leslie Pearlman, Comment, Transsexualism as a Metaphor:The Collision
of Sex and Gender, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 835, 838 n.11 (1995).
51. Leonard J. Long, Optimum Poverty, Character, and the Non-relevance of Poverty
Law, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 693, 774-76 (1995); see also Christian B. Sundquist, Equal Opportunity, Individual Liberty and Meritocracy in Education: Reinforcing Structures of Privilege and Inequality, 9 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL'Y 227, 234-35 (2009).
52. Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship: ChallengingNeoliberal
Attack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783, 858 (2003); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Pursuit
of Social and PoliticalEquality: The PriorityParadigm:Private Choices and the Limits of
Equality, 57 U. PITr. L. REV. 363, 385-86 (1996).
53. See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989) (holding that city plan
awarding contracts to minority businesses violated the Equal Protection Clause because
the City of Richmond "failed to identify the need for remedial action"); Pasadena City Bd.
of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436-37 (1976) (holding that the school district was not
required to ensure that a racially-neutral attendance pattern stayed in place once the initial
remedial measure was taken); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 752 (1974) (holding that
an inter-district desegregation plan was beyond the scope of federal authority because respondents failed to demonstrate that segregation of a school district had an inter-district
effect); see also Cumming, 175 U.S. at 545; Rice, 275 U.S. at 85-86; Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at
44.
54. See supra note 53.
55. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549, 557, 561; see Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action,
134 S. Ct. 1623, 1638 (2014) (holding that there was no federal authority to invalidate an
amendment to the Michigan constitution eliminating affirmative action); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 100 (1995); Carson v.
Warlick, 238 F.2d 724, 728 (4th Cir. 1956).
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Decentralized State
The pre-war role of the federal government in public education policy
was fairly minimal, in large part due to the prevailing view that social
inequality was a natural result of market processes that could not be effectively resolved through governmental intervention.5 6 The abolishment of chattel slavery in the United States did not eliminate the temptation to think of racial and class inequality as the normal consequence
of biological or cultural difference. The failure of the federal government
to respond to Jim Crow segregation, racial discrimination, and poverty
could be seen as morally justifiable only if such inequities were natural
market results that could not be eliminated through direct state action.57
An influential political and pseudo-scientific movement of the time,
Social Darwinism, embodied pre-war efforts to rationalize racial and
class inequality through a misguided application of evolutionary theory.
Social Darwinists believed that social inequality could be traced to racial
and class genetic difference, unsurprisingly arguing that "the white race"
was more highly evolved than non-white "races."5 8 The Social Darwinist
movement asserted that humans could only evolve through unfettered
market competition, and thus, opposed all efforts by the federal (or state)
government to eliminate social inequality.5 9
While the federal government passed a series of acts that would eventually become the precedent for future grant-in-aid programs (such as
ESEA, NCLB and RTT),60 education policy for much of our history was
decentralized and regarded as a matter of local and state authority. 1

56. See Sundquist, The Meaning of Race, supra note 47, at 243; see RICHARD
HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARwINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 5-6 (1955); see J.B. Ruhl, The Fit-

ness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its
PracticalMeaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1426-27 (1996).
57. Sundquist, Genetics, Race and Substantive Due Process, supra note 49.
58. Id. at 357-58.
59.

WILLIAM H. TUCKER, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF RACIAL RESEARCH 27 (1996)

(noting that "the Social Darwinists opposed all governmental programs for charity, free
meals, or other benefits for the undeserving inferior").
60. The Morrill Act, 7 U.S.C. § 301 (1862) (allowing for the creation of so-called "land
grant" colleges); The Smith-Hughes Act, 20 U.S.C. § 11 (1917) (providing federal appropriation for vocational training at the K-12 level). Prior to the Morrill and Smith-Hughes Acts,
the Land Ordinance Act of 1785, and the Northwest Ordinance Act of 1787 provided that
the sale of unsettled federal land would be used for public education purposes. Sean O'Day,
Note, School Trust Lands: The Land Manager's Dilemma Between EducationalFunding
and Environmental Conservation, A Hobson's Choice?, 8 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 163, 172-76
(1999).
61.

PATRICK J. MCGUINN, No CHILD LEFT BEHIND AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF

FEDERAL EDUCATION POLICY, 1965-2005, at 26 (2006).
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The decentralized nature of public education following the Civil War established the conditions necessary for former slave states to invoke federalism as a tool to maintain racial control. Under the banner of "'states'
rights," Southern states advanced a dual conception of federalism as part
of a broader effort to deny African-American (and other non-white) students access to quality education. 62
The United States Supreme Court provided the official imprimatur for
segregative education practices, rejecting equal protection challenges under the Fourteenth Amendment while citing the historical local control
states enjoyed over education policy. The Court's infamous decision in
Plessy v. Ferguson63 upheld the police powers of states to require racial
segregation in the public sphere. In upholding Louisiana's law requiring
the segregation of public conveyances, the Court cited with approval prior
decisions upholding "the establishment of separate schools for white and
colored children." 64 The Court viewed such de jure segregation as "valid
65
exercise[s] of the legislative power" of states, while refusing to locate
federal authority under the Fourteenth Amendment to ensure social
equality:
If the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be
the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other's
merits and a voluntary consent of individuals. . . [I]f one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot
66
put them upon the same plane.
The Court's conceptualization of negative federalism through the lens
of (white) individualism played a pivotal role in shaping education policy
for the next fifty years. Three years after the Plessy decision, the Court

62. Gong Lum, 275 U.S. at 85, 87; Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 54, 58 (1908);
Cumming, 175 U.S. at 545; McMillan v. Sch. Comm., 12 S.E. 330, 331-32 (N.C. 1890); People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438, 447-48 (1883); Bertonneau v. Bd. of Dir. of City
Sch., 3 F. Cas. 294, 296 (C.C.D. La. 1878) (No. 1,361); Dr. A'Lelia Robinson Henry, Perpetuating Inequality: Plessy v. Ferguson and the Dilemma of Black Access Public and Higher
Education, 27 J.L. & EDUC. 47, 49-51 (1998); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE
HISTORY OF BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR

EQUALITY 45 (1976).
63. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
64. Id. at 544.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 551-52.
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upheld a Georgia school board's policy barring African-American students from attending public high schools.67 The Court rejected the Fourteenth Amendment challenge largely on federalism grounds, holding the
following:

[T]he education of the people in schools maintained by state taxation
is a matter belonging to the respective States, and any interference on
the part of Federal authority with the management of such schools
cannot be justified except in the case of a clear and unmistakable disregard of rights secured by the supreme law of the land.6 8

The failure of the local school board to provide a high school education
to tax-paying African-American students, while maintaining a separate
high school for white students, was not regarded as a sufficiently serious
"disregard" of constitutional rights by the Court to justify departing from
its traditional federalism policy of state deference on education matters.69
The Court again utilized a peculiar conception of dual federalism to
reject constitutional challenges to state education policy in Gong Lum v.
Rice.7 0 In Gong Lum, the petitioner challenged a Mississippi law requiring the segregation of "colored" and white students in public schools.71
The Court upheld the state law, citing the Cummings and Plessy decisions for clearly establishing "[t]he right and power of the state to regulate the method of providing for the education of its youth at public expense." 72 The Court concluded by holding that racial segregation of
public schools is a "decision .

.

. within the discretion of the state in reg-

ulating its public schools and does not conflict with the Fourteenth
Amendment." 73
These pre-war cases demonstrate the minimal role played by the federal government, and its courts, in setting public education policy. States
were allowed to exercise their "historic police powers" with respect to education with little to no federal influence or judicial oversight. As a result, many states embraced the "separate but equal" mythology as a
method to preserve social and educational inequality for non-white children. 74

67. Cumming, 175 U.S. at 545.

68. Id.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
275 U.S. 78 (1927).
Id.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 87.
See, e.g., The Beginnings of Black Education, VA. HIST. Soc'Y, http://www.vahist

orical.org/collections-and-resources/virginia-history-explorer/civil-rights-movement-virgin
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B. The Post-war Era of Education Federalism
The end of World War II created the conditions necessary for significant changes to American social policy, including a new understanding
of the appropriate federal role in public education. The post-war world
was compelled by the atrocities of the Holocaust to acknowledge the falsity of biological racial difference, and, as a result, lost an important ar75
tifice in rationalizing unequal treatment based on "race." The historian
Peter B. Levy summarizes this occurrence:
The impact of World War II on the nation's ideology cannot be understated. The war put white supremacy on the defensive through prop-

aganda put forth by the United States in opposition to the Nazi regime
and by means of official proclamations, such as the Atlantic Charter
and the founding documents of the United Nations, which reaffirmed
America's belief in the principles expressed in the Declaration of Independence. Despite segregation in the armed forces and racial violence
at home, the overall message of the war effort was that proponents of
racial supremacy were wrong and that America would prosper because
of its faith in equality and freedom for all. The Holocaust, which revealed to the world the atrocities that could be committed by a people
driven by the ideology of racial supremacy, strengthened the American
public's belief in the ideal of equality for all and marginalized open
76
advocates of white supremacy.

ia/beginnings-black?legacy=true (last visited Oct. 2, 2016); CARTER GOODWIN WOODSON,
THE MIS-EDUCATION OF THE NEGRO (Charles H. Wesley & Thelma D. Perry eds., 1933),

available at http://www.historyisaweapon.com/defcon1/misedne.html;

Robert Lowe, The

Strange History of School Desegregation, RETHINKING SCHOOLS, available at http://www.
rethinkingschools.org/restrict.asp?path=archive/18_03/stral83.shtml (last visited Oct. 2,
2016) (noting that African-American schools received 40% less funding than white schools

during the Brown era).
75. THE RACE QUESTION, UNESCO 6-7 (1950). The UNESCO committee held that "race
[was] not so much a biological phenomenon as a social myth" and that "given similar de-

grees of cultural opportunity to realize their potentialities, the average achievement of the

members of each ethnic group is about the same." Id. at 7; see also Sundquist, The Meaning
of Race, supra note 47, at 232 (explaining that after World War II, there was increased
understanding of race as merely a socio-political construct without any basis in biology);
Chrisitan B. Sundquist, The Dialectics of Racial Genetics, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1751, 1755 (2013)
(observing that the incorrect belief that race has biological meaning has been used to justify
the mistreatment of races deemed inferior); Sundquist, Navigating the Final Frontier,supra note 49, at 59 ("Following the horrific and coldly technical application of unsound scientific theories of race by Nazi Germany in World War II, the world flatly rejected biological
conceptions of race and advocated a perception of race as a social and historical construction.").
76. Sundquist, Genetics, Race and Substantive Due Process, supranote 47, at 365 (quoting PETER B. LEVY, THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 46 (1998)).
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Our society was thus forced to acknowledge that racial and social inequalities were based on structural distortions which could only be alleviated through federal governmental action.7 7 As a result, the "separate
but equal" doctrine sanctioning educational segregation began to become
untenable under American constitutional law. In McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents,7 8 the Court held that the State of Oklahoma had deprived
George W. McLaurin, an African-American student enrolled in a Ph.D
program, of equal protection of the laws through its "separate but equal"
segregation practices in higher education.7 9 In this pre-Brown decision,
the Court referenced the changing social views concerning racial inequality,s0 while recognizing that federal judicial action was necessary to remove "[s] tate-imposed restrictions which produce.

.

. inequalities."81

In its more celebrated companion case, Sweatt v. Painter,82 the Court
unanimously held that the segregated legal education offered to Heman
Sweatt (an African-American student) was not sufficiently equal to comport with the guaranteed protection provided by the Fourteenth Amendment. 83 The Court held that the separate educational experience offered
to Heman Sweatt to study law was not equivalent to the legal education
offered to white students at the University of Texas Law School (to which
Heman Sweatt was denied admission under Texas' "separate but equal"
laws). 84
The decisions in McLaurin and Sweatt, however, did not overturn de
jure segregation in education or the "separate but equal" doctrine. The
Court in Sweatt took pains to explain its refusal to reexamine the constitutionality of Plessy v. Ferguson in the mechanical terms of constitutional
avoidance.85 The Court finally addressed the continuing legality of segregated educational facilities in the widely celebrated decision of Brown v.

77. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524 (1980); DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM
OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992).

78. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
79. Id. at 642.
80. Id. at 641 ("Our society grows increasingly complex, and our need for trained leaders increases correspondingly.").
81. Id.
82. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
83. Id. at 635.
84. Id. at 631.
85. Id. at 631, 636. "Broader issues have been urged for our consideration, but we adhere to the principle of deciding constitutional questions only in the context of the particular
case before the Court." Id. at 631. As such, the Court states that there is no need to "reach
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Board of Education.88 As is well known, in the Brown decision the Court
invalidated "separate but equal" practices under Plessy v. Ferguson by
87
holding that "[s]eparate education facilities are inherently unequal."
The Court recognized the need for federal intervention in equalizing public educational opportunities, 8 8 in part influenced by the changing postwar views of social inequality. 89 The Brown decision, as well as the
Court's subsequent decision allowing the desegregation of public schools
to proceed with "all deliberate speed,"90 have been rightly criticized as
91
being examples of "contradiction closing case[s]" that were decided only
because the Nation's internal and external interests converged with
those of African-Americans. 92 While these and other criticisms of Brown

petitioner's contention that Plessy v. Ferguson should be reexamined in the light of contemporary knowledge respecting the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and the effects of
racial segregation." Id. at 636.
86. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
87. Id. at 495 ("We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place.").
88. Id. at 487 ('In each of the cases, minors of the Negro race, through their legal representatives, seek the aid of the courts in obtaining admission to the public schools of their
community on a nonsegregated basis.").
89. Id. at 492-93 ("In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868
when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.
We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place
in American life throughout the Nation.").
90. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. II, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
91. David Gillborn, The Policy of Inequity: Using CRT to Unmask White Supremacy in
Education Policy, in HANDBOOK OF CRITICAL RACE THEORY IN EDUCATION 135 (Marvin

Lynn & Adrienne D. Dixson eds., 2013) ("[The] concept [of a contradiction-closing case] refers to shifts in policy that appear to address an obvious injustice; hence they remove the
apparent contradiction between, on one hand, a clear injustice and, on the other hand, the
official rhetoric of equality and fairness. However, the cases' long-term impact is by no
means as progressive as is usually assumed.").
92. Bell, supra note 77, at 524-25. The late Professor Bell explained his interest-convergence theory thusly:
The decision in Brown to break with the Court's long-held position on these issues cannot be understood without some consideration of the decision's value to
whites, not simply those concerned about the immorality of racial inequality, but
also those whites in policymaking positions able to see the economic and political
advances at home and abroad that would follow abandonment of segregation.
First, the decision helped to provide immediate credibility to America's struggle
with Communist countries to win the hearts and minds of emerging third world
peoples. ... Advanced by lawyers for both the NAACP and the federal government. And this point was not lost on the news media. Time magazine, for example, predicted that the international impact of Brown would be scarcely less important than its effect on the education of black children: "In many countries,
where U.S. prestige and leadership have been damaged by the fact of U.S. segregation, it will come as a timely reassertion of the basic American principle that
'all men are created equal."' Second, Brown offered much needed reassurance to
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may well be true, the Brown decision nonetheless forever changed the
trajectory of the federal role in public education.
The Brown decision was critically important not only for invalidating
de jure segregation in public education, 93 but also for laying the foundation for a larger federal role in advancing educational equality. As Patrick McGuinn observes, "the Court's powerful statement in Brown ...
would help to give rise to a public conception of education as the birthright of a free citizenry and essential to social justice." 94 Indeed, the
Brown decision at the very least fomented the fight for social equality
while sowing the seeds for the nascent Civil Rights Movement.9 5
The success of the Civil Rights Movement in seizing upon America's
hypocrisy in matters of social and racial inequality led directly to greater
federal involvement in fighting racial discrimination and poverty. As a
result of these efforts, the federal role in public education expanded significantly with the passage of the ESEA.96 Owing in large part to the
American blacks that the precepts of equality and freedom so heralded during
World War II might yet be given meaning at home. Returning black veterans
faced not only continuing discrimination, but also violent attacks in the South
which rivaled those that took place at the conclusion of World War I. Their disillusionment and anger were poignantly expressed by the black actor, Paul Robeson, who in 1949 declared: "It is unthinkable .. . that American Negroes would
go to war on behalf of those who have oppressed us for generations ... against a
country [the Soviet Union] which in one generation has raised our people to the
full human dignity of mankind." It is not impossible to imagine that fear of the
spread of such sentiment influenced subsequent racial decisions made by the
courts. Finally, there were whites who realized that the South could make the
transition from a rural, plantation society to the sunbelt with all its potential
and profit only when it ended its struggle to remain divided by state-sponsored
segregation. Thus, segregation was viewed as a barrier to further industrialization in the South.
Id. at 524-25.
93. Unfortunately, de facto patterns of educational segregation continue to be free from
constitutional scrutiny. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.
1, 551 U.S. 701, 736 (2007); Everett v. Pitt Cty. Bd. of Educ., 788 F.3d 132, 147 (4th Cir.
2015); Robinson v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Educ., 566 F.3d 642, 652 (6th Cir. 2009); Anderson v.
Sch. Bd. of Madison Cty., 517 F.3d 292, 299 (5th Cir. 2008); Taylor v. Ouachita Parish Sch.
Bd., 965 F. Supp. 2d 758, 767 (W.D. La. 2013); Cowan ex rel. Johnson v. Bolivar Cty. Bd. of
Educ., 914 F. Supp. 2d 801, 820 (N.D. Miss. 2012); United States v. Alamance-Burlington
Bd. of Educ., 640 F. Supp. 2d 670, 677 (M.D. N.C. 2009).
94. McGUINN, supranote 61, at 27.
95. See, e.g., James T. Patterson, Brown v. Board of Education and the Civil Rights
Movement, 34 STETSON L. REV. 413 (2005).
96. See Cassandra Jones Harvard, Funny Money: How Federal Education Funding
Hurts Poor and Minority Students, 19 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L.J. 123, 128 (2009) ("The Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education sparked national debate and discussion about the quality of education that black and poor children received in the public
schools. With passage of the ESEA, the federal government focused on the connection between poverty and economic opportunity, and the needs of educationally deprived children
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post-war society's fleeting recognition of the systemic nature of racial and
class inequality, education was seen for the first time less as an excludable private good subject only to local oversight and more as a public good
requiring federal intervention to promote equality.
97
Post-war society, once forced to confront the "American dilemma,"
finally admitted that educational disparities were borne out of both poverty and racial discrimination (rather than cultural differences, biological inferiority, or neutral market outcomes). The ESEA, as informed by
Brown, was thus implemented with explicit legislative intent to combat
educational inequality through enhanced funding and services to segre98
Indeed, the ESEA "was part
gated and impoverished school districts.
of a larger campaign to provide educational opportunities to poor and minority children that began with the landmark Brown v. Board of Educa99
tion decision of 1954 that prohibited racial segregation in schools."
enTherefore, the ESEA intended to address not only poverty through
hanced federal funding, but to also assist public schools with "comply[ing]
with the desegregation mandate" articulated in Brown.1oo The substantive dimension of public education federalism in the modern era accord01
ingly centered on the "first principles" of both class and racial equality.1

for the first time in the country's history."); McGUINN, supra note 61, at 25 ("The Brown
decision, together with the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), initiated a new era of federal activism in education and laid the foundation of a policy regime
that was to last for approximately thirty years.").
97. See MYRDAL, supra note 48.
98. H.R. 2362, 89th Cong. § 201 (1965) (enacted); see also BRIAN L. FIFE, OLD SCHOOL
STILL MATTERS: LESSONS FROM HISTORY To REFORM PUBLIc EDUCATION IN AMERICA 104
(2013) ("The most explicit objective of the ESEA was part of a more grandiose vision of
President Johnson. As part of his War on Poverty, he believed that federal funds could
improve education for poor children."); McGUINN, supra note 61, at 25 ("At the heart of the
ESEA regime was a powerful equity rationale for federal government activism to promote
greater economic opportunity through more equal access to more equally funded schools.").
99. Joseph P. Viteritti, The FederalRole in School Reform: Obama's "Race to the Top,"
87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2087, 2090 (2012); see also MCGUINN, supranote 61, at 31 ("ESEA
was premised on the idea that the federal government should intervene in what was increasingly seen as an educational crisis among poor and minority children.").
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., Jennifer E.K. Kendrex, Punishingthe Poorthrough Welfare Reform: Cruel
and Unusual?, 64 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 121, 127 (2015) (noting that the ESEA and various
welfare initiatives during the 1960s were passed largely in response to the increasing
awareness of racial inequality in the United States and its contribution to poverty'). Id.
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III. NEGATIVE FEDERALISM AND THE COMPETITIVE MODEL OF
PUBLIC EDUCATION

The lofty social justice goals of both Brown v. Board of Education and
the ESEA became perverted in time, as the substantive values informing
education federalism shifted from promoting equality through a race and
class-regarding use of public funds to enhancing the private market aspects of public education in order to promote consumer choice, competition, and accountability. The changed view of the appropriate federal
role in education was influenced by a reversion to poverty and discrimination "neutral" rationalizations of social inequality. Educational inequality along the lines of race and class was once again justified on the
grounds of either cultural difference, market outcomes, or both.
As to the former, conservative legislators and sociologists "argued that
disadvantaged students suffered from a 'culture of poverty' and that they
could only succeed if they were taught middle-class values." 102 New York
Congressperson Daniel Patrick Moynihan, for example, published a report on "The Negro Family" the same year the ESEA was enacted which
argued that the federal government should deemphasize the issue of racism and discrimination in its social policy. 103 The basis for the report's
finding was the dubious conclusion that African-American inequality was
"capable of perpetuating itself without assistance from the white world"
and "[a]t the heart of the deterioration of the fabric of Negro society is
the deterioration of the Negro family." 104 A few short years later, Congressperson Moynihan urged President Nixon that "the time may have
come when the issue of race could benefit from a period of 'benign neglect"' as the "Subject" of race "had been too much talked about."105 "Culture of Poverty" theories soon came into sociological vogue,106 which were
cited by legislators as grounds to deemphasize the federal role in eliminating social and racial inequality.1 07

102. McGUINN, supranote 61, at 31.
103. OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE NEGRO

FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION ("The Moynihan Report") (1965).
104. Id.
105. Peter Kihss, "Benign Neglect"on Race is Proposed by Moynihan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
1, 1970, at 1.
106.

See, e.g., WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE 23

(1980).
107.

AFRICAN AMERICAN LITERATURE BEYOND RACE: AN ALTERNATIVE READER 23-24

(Gene Andrew Jarrett ed., 2006).
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A. The Market Model of Public Education
The more significant resistance to educational equality came in the
form of "freedom of choice" and "school choice" policies designed to limit
desegregation via the race-neutral artifices of "individual freedom" and
"consumer preference."10 8 It should not be surprising that "'freedom-ofchoice' plans in education became a euphemism for resurgent racial segregation."10 9 As Professor Martha Minow recounts, "school choice policies
emerged shortly after the Supreme Court's 1954 and 1955 decisions in
Brown as a form of white southerners' resistance to court-ordered desegregation." 110 Indeed, classic-market economist Milton Friedman published his seminal report advocating school choice and "voucher" reform
immediately after (and, arguably, in reaction to) the Brown decisions. 1 1
In addition to promoting freedom of choice policies to prevent desegregation of public schools, many Southern states also resisted Brown by creating private schools of choice (also known as segregation academies) to
facilitate white flight from desegregating public schools. 112
Educational inequality, according to choice proponents, owes its legacy
not to systemic racism or poverty, but rather to distortions in the market
caused by governmental intervention (such as Brown and the ESEA).113
Under this viewpoint, education policy should strive to promote competition and consumer choice in order to create an efficient marketplace of
schools. 114 The school choice movement thus has long been closely associated with, and informed by, privatization reform initiatives. 115
The allure of the school choice movement lies in its simplicity. Educational inequality is reduced to a matter of distorted market functions,
which can be alleviated through deregulation and the restoration of competition and choice. The fault of disparate educational outcomes lies not

108. Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in ECONOMICS AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 123
109.

(Robert A. Solo ed., 1955).

MARTHA MINOW,

IN BROWN'S WAKE: LEGACIES OF AMERICA'S

EDUCATIONAL

LANDMARK 117 (2010).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 116-17.
112.

DIANE RAVITCH, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL SYSTEM

114 (2011).
113. See Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, supra note 108.
114. Id.; MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 91 (1962); see also Joseph P.
Viteritti, Defining Equity: Politics, Markets, and Public Policy, in SCHOOL CHOICE: THE
MORAL DEBATE 15 (Alan Wolfe ed., 2003).
115. See, e.g., JEFFREY R. HENIG, RETHINKING SCHOOL CHOICE 6-8, 78 (1994) ('Like proponents for privatization, [choice] education reformers look to economic theory and corporate practice for their models."); RAVITCH, THE GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL SYSTEM, supra
note 112, at 114.
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in complex systems of poverty and racial discrimination, under the choice
viewpoint, but rather a mistaken view of the appropriate state role in
establishing education policy. As former Assistant Secretary of Education Diane Ravitch explains:
There is something comforting about the belief that the invisible hand
of the market, as Adam Smith called it, will bring improvements
through some unknown force. In education, this .belief in market
forces lets us ordinary mortals off the hook.. .One need not know anything about children or education. The lure of the market is the idea
116
that freedom from government regulation is a solution all by itself.
The "comfort" of the choice movement lies in the luxury of rationalizing
the existence of inequality without the need to interrogate existing class
and racial privilege.11 7 Acknowledging the existence of privilege leads to
cognitive dissonance for the privilege-holder, and "[t]he potential psychic
damage .

.

. forces most to ignore and suppress alternative explanations

for their status that depart from the assumption of naturalness and neutrality." 118 The evolution of "choice" and "competition" reform narratives
can be traced in part to this psychological desire to normalize inequality
by either ignoring or failing to fully appreciate the role that poverty and
19
racial bias play in perpetuating educational disparities.'
The use of "federalism" to mediate this classic American dilemma (between democracy and inequality) has significantly impacted modern ed20
Both the No
ucational policy since Brown and the original ESEA.1

116. RAVITCH, THE GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL SYSTEM, supra note 112, at 11.
117. Id. at 91-92 (explaining that the choice movement believes that "poverty can be
overcome by effective teachers" and are necessary to rectify a "culture of excuse").
118. Sundquist, The Meaning of Race in the DNA Era, supra note 47, at 233; see also
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); BARBARA J. FLAGG, WAS BLIND BUT Now I SEE:
WHITE RACE CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE LAW 34 (1998); Christian B. Sundquist, Critical
Praxis, Spirit Healing, and Community Activism: Preservinga Subversive Dialogue on Reparations, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 675-76 (2001-2003).
119. John T. Jost, Outgroup Favoritism and the Theory of System Justification:A Paradigm for Investigating the Effects of Socioeconomic Success on Stereotype Content, in
COGNITIVE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE PRINCETON SYMPOSIUM ON THE LEGACY AND FUTURE

OF SOCIAL COGNITION 90 (2013) (explaining that System Justification Theory is the theory
that "people use ideas about groups and individuals to reinforce existing social systems and
preserve the sense that those systems are fair, legitimate, and justifiable").
120. President Reagan, for example, embraced the choice movement in promoting his
agenda of "New federalism"- a form of competitive federalism. In passing modifications to
the ESEA, President Reagan "hoped either to eliminate the federal role in schools or to
redefine the nature of the federal education policy regime by making privatization, choice,
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Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) and the Race to the Top Act of
2009 (RTT) reforms encourage inter-school competition by promoting parental choice while measuring school success through accountability
standards, which are often developed by private entrepreneurs. 121 The
two acts "preserved testing, accountability and choice at the center of the
federal agenda" while "open[ing] the door to huge entrepreneurial opportunities" funded by federal dollars for private tutoring and testing services. 122
The NCLB and RTT rest upon two bedrock principles: choice and accountability. NCLB provided specifically for school choice in allowing
that "[p]arents of students in Title I schools identified for school improvement, corrective action, or restructuring will have the option to transfer
to another public school in the district not in school improvement."1 23 As
such, NCLB hoped to promote inter-school competition as a method to
develop markets within school districts. One assumption underlying
NCLB, therefore, is that parents and students would act as rational actors in exercising such choice so that schools would have a "substantial
incentive... to improve." 124 The Department of Education touted NCLB
as stimulating educational innovation and progress through the promotion of market competition and choice: "Systems are often resistant to
change no matter how good the intentions of those who lead them. Competition can be the stimulus a bureaucracy needs in order to change. For
that reason, the administration seeks to increase parental options and
influence." 125
Accountability standards were also incorporated into NCLB, in part to
support consumer choice and the conditions for market competition. Parental choice under NCLB is only triggered once a school is deemed to be
and competition - rather than equity - its guiding principles." MCGUINN, supra note 61,
at 42 (tracing the evolution of President Reagan's "new federalism" approach to education).
121. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, § 1001, 115 Stat. at 1439-40 (codified at 20 U.S.C.
§ 6301 (2012)); Race to the Top, American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, §§
14005-6, 123 Stat. at 282-84; see also RAVITCH, THE GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL System, supra note 112, at 93-113.
122. RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR: THE HOAX OF THE PRIVATIZATION MOVEMENT AND THE
DANGER TO AMERICA'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 12 (2014).

123. Dan J. Nichols, Brown v. Board of Education and the No Child Left Behind Act:
Competing Ideologies, 2005 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 151, 173 (2005) (quoting Overview: Introduction: Executive Summary of No Child Left Behind, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., available at
hppt://www.ed.gov/nclb/overview/intro.index.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2004)).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 173 n.74 (quoting Stronger Accountability: No Child Left Behind: President
Bush's Education Reform Plan, PromotingParentalOptions and Innovative Programs,U.S.
DEP'T OF EDUC., available at htttp://www.ed.gov/nclb/overview/intro/presidentplan/page
_pg9.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2016)).
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"failing" under its accountability provisions. The designation of a school
as failing not only allows students to enroll in a different school, but also
pressures the school into converting into a privately-run charter school
or ceding control to a private management company. 126 These two "principles of high-stakes accountability and school choice plans of NCLB have
been at the center of the modern conservative movement's education re27
form plan" to redefine the federal role in public education.1
The competitive federalist nature of NCLB and RTT was left largely
unchanged by the revisions made by ESSA in December 2015. ESSA
continues NCLB's focus on creating competitive education markets, implementing high-stakes testing, deregulation, and expanding consumer
choice for parents. 128 The most significant changes implemented by
ESSA-enhanced state and local control of accountability and testing
systems,1 29 expanded charter school funding, 130 increased consumer
32
choice, 131 and deregulated professional standards for teachersl -- preserve rather than transcend the neoliberal legacy of NCLB and RTT.
Liberal and conservative pundits have hailed the ESSA for "returning
control to states and local districts" of the accountability methods used to
evaluate school and student performance. 133 Under the ESSA, states can
choose to either adopt test-based accountability plans already approved

126. RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR, supranote 122, at 11, 97-98. Failing schools wishing to
remain in compliance with NCLB also have the option of replacing the administration and
staff, turning over control of the school to state authorities, or engaging in "any other major
restructuring" of the school's governance. Id. at 11.
127. Id.
128. Every Student Succeeds Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015).
129. Id. tit. I ("Improving Basic Programs Operated by State and Local Educational
Agencies") and tit. V ("State Innovation and Local Flexibility").
130. Id. tit. IV ("21st Century Schools").
131. Id. tit. I and tit. IV.
132. Id. tit. II ("Preparing, Training and Recruiting High-Quality Teachers, Principals,
or Other School Leaders").
133. Emmarie Huetteman & Motoko Rich, House Restores Local Education Control in
Revising No Child Left Behind, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2015), availableat http://www.nytime
s.com/2015/12/03/us/house-restores-local-education-control-in-revising-no-child-left-behin
d.html?_r=0. Section 1111(g) of ESSA provides:
PROHIBITIONS. "(i) STANDARDS REVIEW OR APPROVAL.-A State shall
not be required to submit any standards developed under this subsection to the
Secretary for review or approval. "(ii) FEDERAL CONTROL.-The Secretary
shall not have the authority to mandate, direct, control, coerce, or exercise any
direction or supervision over any of the challenging State academic standards
adopted or implemented by a State.
ESSA § 111(g), 129 Stat. at 1825.
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by the federal government (such as the Common Core) or develop alternative accountability standards. 134 It nonetheless remains unclear
whether states will invest the significant time and money involved in developing alternative accountability standards, when such plans remain
subject to approval by the federal Department of Education.135 In any
event, ESSA appears to be a mere rebranding of the NCLB/RTT framework
ven as it relates to the modified accountability provisions. Prior
to the passage of the ESSA, an astounding forty-two states (as well as
the District of Columbia) had already been granted waivers by the Department of Education from the stringent federal accountability
measures "in exchange for states' commitment to 'setting their own
higher, more honest standards for student success."' 136 As such, the shift
of power contemplated by the ESSA merely seems to formalize what had
become standard practice under NCLB and RTT.
The ESSA also continues the focus of NCLB and RTT on deregulating
public education through the expansion of both charter schools 137 and exemptions from university-based teacher preparation programs. 1 38 In particular, Title II of the ESSA allows states to authorize non-university administered teacher preparation academies to prepare teachers for highpoverty schools. 139 Such schools are then exempted from the "unnecessary restrictions on the methods the academy will use to train prospective teacher[s]," such as "advanced degrees," specific "undergraduate

134. ESSA, § 1111, 129 Stat. at 1820. Section 1111(b) of ESSA provides:
ACADEMIC
AND
STANDARDS
ACADEMIC
CHALLENGING
ASSESSMENTS."(1) CHALLENGING STATE ACADEMIC STANDARDS."(A) IN GENERAL-Each State in the plan it files under subsection (a), shall
provide an assurance that the State has adopted challenging academic content
standards and aligned academic achievement standards (referred to in this Act
as 'challenging State academic standards'), which achievement standards shall
include not less than 3 levels of achievement, that will be used by the State, its
local educational agencies, and its schools to carry out this part.
A State shall not be required to submit such challenging State academic standards to the Secretary.
Id.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., Alia Wong, The Bloated Rhetoric of No Child Left Behind's Demise,
ATIANTIC (Dec. 9, 2015).
137. ESSA § 5101, 129 Stat. at 1994 (stating the legislative intent to, inter alia, "increase the number of high-quality charter schools available to students across the United
States" and to "encourage States to provide support to charter schools for facilities financing
in an amount more nearly commensurate to the amount States typically provide for traditional public schools").
138. Id. § 2002, 129 Stat. at 1914.
139. Id.
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coursework," "the number of course credits," or "obtaining accreditation." 140 The deregulated provisions of the ESSA that lessen the standards states use to authorize new teachers in high-poverty schools appear
to "have been primarily written to support entrepreneurial programs like
those funded by venture philanthropists." 14 1
The ESSA thus represents a political rebranding of the old NCLB and
RTT regime in that it maintains the former's focus on promoting competition, accountability, deregulation, and standardized testing, while
shifting responsibility for overseeing certain measures to the states.1 42
B. The Failingsof Choice, Competition, and Market-Based Education
Reforms
In this milieu, the original purpose of the ESEA and Brown (and of the
appropriate federal role in education) has become lost. Rather than utilizing federal policy and funding to combat the true roots of educational
disparity-poverty and racial discrimination-the federal role has shifted
under the market model to conceal these roots. The belief has become
that "effective teaching" and a business-model of public education is all

140. Id. § 2002(4)(B), 129 Stat. at 1915. Section 2002 (4)(B) provides the following:
TEACHER, PRINCIPAL, OR OTHER SCHOOL LEADER PREPARATION
ACADEMY.-The term "teacher, principal, or other school leader preparation
academy" means a public or other nonprofit entity, which may be an institution
of higher education or an organization affiliated with an institution of higher
education, that establishes an academy that will prepare teachers, principals, or
other school leaders to serve in high-needs schools, and that- "(B) does not have
unnecessary restrictions on the methods the academy will use to train prospective teacher, principal, or other school leader candidates, including-" (i) obligating (or prohibiting) the academy's faculty to hold advanced degrees or conduct
academic research; "(ii) restrictions related to the academy's physical infrastructure;" (iii) restrictions related to the number of course credits required as part of
the program of study; "(iv) restrictions related to the undergraduate coursework
completed by teachers teaching or working on alternative certificates, licenses,
or credentials, as long as such teachers have successfully passed all relevant
State-approved content area examinations;" or(v) restrictions related to obtaining accreditation from an accrediting body for purposes of becoming an academy.
Id.
141. Valerie Strauss, The DisturbingProvisionsAbout Teacher Preparationin No Child
Left Behind Rewrite, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2015).
142. LA Times Editorial Board, Every Student Succeeds Act Fails Too Many Students
(Oct. 2, 2016), availableat https://www.the74million.org/article/wilhiams-why-progressivesshould-fear-conservatives-should-hate-and-obama-should-veto-the-nclb-rewrite
("Every
Student Succeeds Act. . . is even more of lie [than NCLB] [in that it] is a compromise that
benefits pretty much everyone but the students most in need of improved schools.") ("What
this bill doesn't change specifically in substance it does change in rhetoric. I think if anything, this bill really takes the air out of the political footballs that have been Common Core
and over-testing.") (quoting Tamara Hiler).
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that is needed to overcome generational poverty and persistent racial discrimination. 143 Yet, it has become abundantly clear that the market
strivings of federal education policy have forsaken the original promise
of social equality embodied by Brown and the ESEA.
Our history demonstrates that school choice policies tend to develop as
a tool to undermine Brown desegregation efforts as part of a larger effort
to maintain racial inequality. While often utilizing race-neutral language such as "parental choice" and "individual freedom," modern choice
policy "ha[s] the potential to perpetuate racial hierarchies" as parents
make private decisions to self-segregate their children. 144 The equity rationale of Brown and the original vision of the ESEA are simply incompatible with the market rationale of current education policy:
[It] is apparent that two distinctly different ideologies motivated the
Brown decision and NCLB. For Brown a separate education could
never be equal, and affirmative racial integration was necessary to
provide every child with a quality education. Conversely, under NCLB
the ideologies of high-stakes accountability and a market-driven approach [assume] that a separate education can be equal. 145
The modeling of education policy around principles of consumer choice,
competition, and market- accountability have increased educational disparities along class and race lines. 146 Since the adoption of NCLB and
RTT, our public schools have become increasingly segregated by race. 147
There is little reason to believe that rates of school segregation will decrease because of the passage of the ESSA, especially in light of its continued expansion of charter schools, deregulation, and parental choice.
The choice provisions of the ESSA (and formerly of NCLB and RTT) are
fueling the re-segregation of our public schools primarily because the current market-model of education policy incorrectly assumes parents (that

143.

MICHELLE RHEE, RADICAL: FIGHTING TO PUT STUDENTS FIRST xii-xiv (2013).

144. John A. Powell, A New Theory of IntegratedEducation, in SCHOOL RESEGREGATION:
MUST THE SOUTH TURN BACK 289 (John Charles Boger & Gary Orfield eds., 2005).
145. Nichols, supra note 123, at 151-52 (noting "NCLB emerged from a decades-long
conservative movement seeking to reform education using market and business models").
146. Sean F. Reardon, No Rich Child Left Behind, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2013), available
at http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/27/no-rich-child-left-behind/ (noting that
"differences in educational success between high- and lower-income students have grown
substantially" since the adoption of NCLB).
147. Christopher Lubienski & Peter Weitzel, Choice, Integration, and EducationalOpportunity: Evidence on Competitive Incentives for Student Sorting in Charter Schools, 12 J.
GENDER, RACE & JUST. 351, 358 (2009); Robert Bifulco & Helen F. Ladd, School Choice,
Racial Segregation and Test-Score Gaps: Evidence from North Carolina's Charter School
Program, 26 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 31, 52 (2006).
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is, namely consumers) to be rational actors. A core principle of the market-model is that choice will foster competition amongst public schools,
which then will force individual schools to improve the quality of education provided to students. 148 However, it has become increasingly clear
that parents tend to choose schools "with a racial profile matching their
own." 1 4 9 Indeed, there is evidence that the current school-choice provisions have so upset the racial balance of certain public schools as to run
afoul of Brown Court desegregation orders. 150
Parents selecting a school for their children are also influenced by
"non-racial" factors not adequately captured by the market model of competition-including geography, inadequate resources, lack of motivation,
and inadequate information regarding other options. 15 1 The application
of market principles to public education has failed not only due to an incorrect assumption of rational acting by consumers, but because of significant informational asymmetries between schools and parents. 152
The allure of choice as a salve for racial and social inequality in education is understandable, yet misguided. Martha Minow has written extensively on the "seductive" nature of choice, noting that choice can "imply that freedom and equality exist even when they are absent."1 53
Professor Minow observes "that [b]y subordinating racial and other kinds
of integration to school choice, contemporary schooling policies. . . expressly elevate private preferences" which tend to "reinforce or even
worsen racial separation in American schools." 15 4 Professor John A. Powell summarizes the failings of school choice as follows:

148. No Child Left Behind Act § 1001, 115 Stat. at 1439-40 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6301);
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act §§ 14005-6, 123 Stat. at 282-84.
149. Tom Loveless & Katharyn Field, Perspectives on Charter Schools, in HANDBOOK OF
RESEARCH ON SCHOOL CHOICE 111 (2010).
150. See Cathryn Vaughn, The School Choice Provisionof the No Child Left Behind Act
and its Conflict with DesegregationOrders, 13 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 79, 85-86 (2003).
151. See HENIG, supra note 115, at 57.
152. See Lubienski & Weitzel, supra note 147, at 367.
153. Martha Minow, Confronting the Seduction of Choice: Law, Education and American Pluralism, 120 YALE L.J. 814, 817 (2011). Professor Minow explains that "[i]n light of
existing preferences and inequalities, the options of private schooling and public subsidies
for school vouchers, magnet schools, and charter schools can easily undermine integration
along lines of race, class, gender and disability." Id. at 817.
154. Id. at 845; see also Rosemary C. Salomone, The Common School Before and After
Brown: Democracy, Equality and the Productivity Agenda, 120 YALE L.J. 1454, 1472-73
(2011) (noting that the focus of public education policy shifted from "racial integration and
equal resources" during the post-Brown era to accountability following NCLB).
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The reality of choice is that it is a racialized system that reproduces
the inequity it is supposed to address. Effective responses to persistent segregation and concentrated poverty cannot be furnished by
purely individualistic solutions such as letting students choose their
school one by one. The Supreme Court considered this approach after
155
Brown and rejected it as inadequate.
The larger problem with the market-model of public education is that
it serves to normalize continued educational inequality. The existing
framework purports to provide students with an equal opportunity to
pursue an education from competitive options. The occurrence of educational failures within such a "neutral" market of consumer preferences
can then be interpreted as owing to poor choices or personal deficit under
this perspective, thereby rationalizing the persistence of racial and social
15 6
Diane Ravitch concluded as follows:
educational disparities.
The testing, accountability and choice strategies offer the illusion of
change while changing nothing. They mask the inequity and injustice
that are now so apparent in our social order. They do nothing to alter
the status quo. They preserve the status quo. They are the status
quo.

15 7

School choice and accountability reforms, as noted, have had relatively
15 8
The primary determinants of
little impact on student performance.
student success, rather, have been racial bias, family background, and
15 9
The focus on "neoliberal solutions like NCLB,
socioeconomic status.

155. See Powell, supra note 144, at 290.
156. Sundquist, The Meaning of Race, supranote 47, at 234-35; Alan Singer, Will Every
Student Succeed? Not with this Law, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 16, 2015) (NCLB and RTT
"became an excuse not to address the fundamental problems causing poor academic performance by Black and Latino youth, racial and ethnic segregation, persistent poverty and
unemployment in their communities, and inadequate school funding.")
157. RAVITCH, supra note 122, at 225; see also Nichols, supra note 123, at 172 (arguing
that the NCLB foundational principles of choice and accountability conflict with the equality goals of Brown v. Board v. Educationin that they focus on providing "every student...
an opportunity to 'bloom where planted' [and thus].. reflects [a] lack of faith in racial integration").
158. KEVIN B. SMITH & KENNETH MEIER, THE CASE AGAINST SCHOOL CHOICE: POLITICS,
MARKETS AND FOOLS 21 (1995); GARY MIRON, STEPHANIE EVERGREEN & JESSICA URSCHEL,
THE IMPACT OF SCHOOL CHOICE REFORMS ON STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT, WESTERN MICHIGAN

UNIVERSITY 22 (2008); Valerie Strauss, What the New NAEP Test Really Tells Us, WASH.
POST (Nov. 1, 2011), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/
2
post/what-the-new-naep-test-results-really-tell-us/ 011/11/01/gIQADSOtcM-blog.html.
159. SMITH & MEIER, supra note 158. Contemporary research has also demonstrated
that student success is primarily dictated by non-school factors, such as poverty and family
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with its emphasis on efficiency and individualism, divert attention away
from the social issues that need to be solved if we are to really improve
education outcomes."160 As a result, current education policy "both directly and indirectly exacerbates racial, ethnic and economic inequality
in society."161 Our current approach to public education has grossly departed from the ideals and principles of racial and class equality that
shaped the federal education role during the post-Brown and ESEA era.
The substantive dimension of education federalism has thus wrongly
shifted from ensuring racial equality in a democratic society to ensuring
consumer choice in a competitive marketplace.
The recent enactment of the ESSA creates the possibility of further
exacerbating race and class-based educational inequalities. While retaining the core principles of NCLB, the ESSA diminishes federal oversight of school performance while further expanding both consumer
choice and deregulated teacher preparation programs. As Marian
Wright Edelman observes, such a "gutting [of] a strong federal role in
[an] education policy designed to protect [African-American and Latino]
children . .. jeopardiz[es] their opportunity for a fair and adequate education."162 Civil rights groups, including the Southern Poverty Law Center and the New York chapter of the NAACP, fear that decreased "federal
oversight of education will be much too weak to ensure [equal] education
for Black and Latino students" in many states.163 The prominent education and urban planning researcher Gary Orfield further opines that with
the ESSA "we're going to get something that's much worse [than
NCLB]-a lot of federal money going out for almost no leverage for any
national purpose." 64 Education advocate Kalmann Hettlemann similarly views the ESSA as "a massive retreat from our national interest
and commitment to equal educational opportunity, especially for poor
and minority children."165

income. See Diane Ravitch, The Myth of CharterSchools, BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 26, 2011),
availableat http://www.brookings.edu/researchlarticles/2010/11/11-superman-ravitch.
160. David Hursh, Exacerbating Inequality: The Failed Promise of the No Child Left
Behind Act, 10 RACE, ETHNICITY & EDUC. 295, 305 (2007).
161. Id. at 306; see also Minow, supra note 153, at 848 (noting that market-based education reform can "obscure[] continuing inequalities in access and need" by "convert[ing]
schooling to private desires').
162. Marian Wright Edelman, The Education Inequality Struggle, HUFFINGTON POST
(Dec. 11, 2015).
163. Singer, Will Every Student Succeed?, supranote 156.
164. Id.
165. Kalmann R. Hettleman, New Education Law is More Capitulationthan Compromise, BALTIMORE SUN (Dec. 10, 2015).
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The education federalism forged by the original ESEA and Brown envisioned federal regulation of public education to the extent necessary to
16 6
Such robust federal
promote social equality and racial integration.
oversight was necessary in light of the historical practice of states to un67
dermine educational opportunity for poor and minority children.1 The
devolution of the federal role in public education following the ESSAcoupled with its continued emphasis on standardized testing, choice, and
market competition-threatens to increase race- and class-based disparities in education.
IV. POSITIVE FEDERALISM AND PUBLIC EDUCATION POLICY

The divining of the appropriate federal role in public education has
historically been rooted in a procedural vision of the negative limits of
federal action. The discussion of education federalism, therefore, has
largely focused on the degree to which federal law should influence or
68
While negative branches
supersede traditional state "police powers."1
of federalism often purport to balance federal and state interests in an
ideologically neutral fashion, it is clear that the federalism debate is also
imbued with particular substantive conceptions of the content and preferred outcomes of permissible federal actions.
The original allocation of "police powers" to states-which established
local responsibility for the health, education, and safety of residentshas long been derided as a constitutional compromise to allow states to
169
The invocation of "states'
preserve slavery and prevent racial progress.
rights" following the Brown desegregation decree is just one example of
170
negative federalism being utilized as a tool to resist social progress.
Indeed, as Professor Lisa Miller notes, "federalism in the United States
was forged in part as a mechanism for accommodating slavery, and it
facilitated resistance to racial progress for blacks long after the Civil

166. See supra Part II.
167. See supra Part II.
168. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972); Interstate Consol. St. Ry.
Co. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, 87 (1907); Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d
454, 462 (2d Cir. 1996); Monaghan v. Sch. Dist., 211 Ore. 360, 373 (1957).
169. See Lisa L. Miller, The Invisible Black Victim: How American Federalism Perpetuates Racial Inequality in Criminal Justice, 44 L. & Soc'Y REV. 805, 810 (2010); PAUL
FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: FEDERALISM, COMITY AND SLAVERY 11 (1981).

170. See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 109, at 21; William G. Ross, Attacks on the Warren
Court by State Officials: A Study of Why Court-CurbingMovements Fail, 50 BUFF. L. REV.
438, 492 (2002); Miller, supra note 169, at 807. Professor Lisa Miller explains that "[flor
much of the nation's history, American-style federalism has allowed the national government to escape pressure and responsibility for addressing inequality and stagnation in racial progress." Id.
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War." 171 Pre-war education federalism thus often strove to forestall federal intervention in state systems of racial control in an effort to preserve
educational segregation and inequality. 172
The passage of the ESEA, in light of this history, was monumentally
important in shifting the substantive dimension of education federalism.
No longer was education federalism centered on preserving states' rights
to segregate disproportionately funded public schools. Rather, education
federalism in the post-Brown and ESEA era sought to utilize the federal
government's block grant powers to rectify racial and class imbalances in
public education. 1 73 The substantive dimension of post-Brown education
federalism, as embodied by the original vision of the ESEA, justifies federal involvement in public education when necessary to combat both poverty and racial discrimination. 174
The substantive dimension of modern education federalism, however,
has been radically transformed through the ESSA, NCLB, and RTT policies. Federal activism in public schools is no longer justified to the extent it reduces class and racial disparities in education, but rather to the
extent it promotes competition, choice, and accountability. 175 The embrace of competitive federalism by modern education policy is misplaced
from a historical perspective, and represents an unconstitutional abrogation of the federal government's responsibility to eliminate class and racial disparities in education. The promise of Brown and of the original
purpose of the ESEA cannot be realized without a reconceptualization of
education federalism as requiring positive race- and class-regarding actions by the federal government.
A. A Positive Conception of EducationFederalism
While negative visions of federalism long have been wielded as a tool
to de-legitimize federal efforts to combat racial and class inequality,17 6
federalism is more appropriately understood as empowering the federal

171. Miller, supranote 169, at 806.
172. See supra Part II.
173. See supra Part II.
174. See supra Part III.
175. See supra Part III.
176. Miller, supra note 169, at 806 ("American federalism limits the authority and political incentives of the central government to address a wide range of social problems that
give rise to crime and diffuses political power across multiple venues, which makes it difficult for the poor and low-resources groups to access decision-making."); Kevin Brown, The
Implications of the Equal ProtectionClause for the Mandatory Integration of Public School
Students, 29 CONN. L. REV. 999, 1002 (1997).
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Federalism should
government to directly respond to social inequality.
of decency
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fundamental
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and fairness which
178
rather
institutions,"
political
and
civil
all
our
of
base
at
the
lying
justice
than a negative limit on the government's ability to advance liberty.
Traditional theories of negative federalism are roundly criticized as
179
The failings of
being incoherent, indeterminate, and rights regressive.
unstable asto
in
part
traced
be
can
federalism
of
conceptions
negative
sumptions about the policy values that should inform federalism theory.
Traditional theories of federalism recite a number of values that are purportedly advanced by restricting federal action: the reduction of "federal
tyranny," enhancing state experimentation, improving the democratic
process, advancing "liberty," and restoring the "original meaning" of the
Constitution. 18 0 And yet, scholars have demonstrated that limiting fed81
eral action does little to advance such policy values,1 and instead exac182
The question then becomes -what constituerbates social inequality.
tional values should inform education federalism policy?
I posit, perhaps unremarkably, that the first principles of our Consti1 83
A theory of
tution are social equality and democratic representation.
federalism should respect these overarching aspirations of our Constitution, while recognizing that positive federal action has historically been
necessary to both reduce inequality and enhance the democratic process.1 84 Federalism exists for this normative purpose: to ensure equality
of the people, which at times requires positive intervention from the federal government. A positive conception of federalism, then, acknowledges

See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 3.
178. William J. Brennan, Jr., Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners:An Exercise
in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REV. 423, 442 (1961); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 324
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("Justice is the end of government. It is the
end of civil society.").
177.

179.

See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30.

180. Id. at 11.
181. Id.; Frank Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304, 1305 (1999).

182. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 11; see also Thomas Kleven, FederalizingPublic
Education, 55 VILLANOVA L. REV. 369, 370 (2010).
183. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30

passim;

THE

DECLARATION

OF

INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men
are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."); CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 30, at 99, 117 (arguing that the "primary objectives of the United States Constitution"
are maintaining an effective government and advancing liberty); see JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 6, 60 (1971); see BRUCE A. AcKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL

STATE 18 (1980).
184. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 17.
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the constitutional obligation of the federal government to promote social
justice and democratic fairness.18 5
B. A Positively FederalistView for FutureReauthorizations of the ESEA
A positive conception of federalism is particularly justified when attempting to divine the appropriate federal role in public education. As
discussed previously, the primary constitutional basis for federal involvement in public education is premised on the government's responsibility
to take positive action to remedy racial and class inequalities.18 6 The
Brown constitutional doctrine and the "War on Poverty" driven by the
ESEA forged an understanding of education federalism rooted in positive
social justice. It is particularly appropriate today that we restore this
fundamental understanding of education federalism, given evidence of
increasing racial disparities in public education and the noted failures of
modern education federalism policy.
The federal guarantee of equal public education is critically important
to the functioning of our democracy. As a public good, education helps
our society develop those "fundamental values necessary to the transmission of our democratic society." 187 The provision of an equitable public
education, devoid of identity-based disparities, is critical to provide children with "the knowledge needed to understand and participate effectively in the democratic process and to cultivate among children respect
for and the ability to interact with others as beings of inherently equal
moral worth."1 88 Indeed, both classic and contemporary constitutional
scholars argue that equal public education should be regarded as "a fundamental duty, or positive fundamental right because education is a
basic human need and a constituent part of all democratic rights."1 89 The
need, then, for a robust application of positive education federalism principles in this context cannot be stronger.

185. See RAWLS, supra note 183; see ACKERMAN, supranote 183.
186. See Part IV.
187. Brown, supra note 176, at 1002; see also Powell, supranote 144, at 289.
188. Kleven, supra note 182, at 374.
189. Areto A. Imoukhuede, EducationRights and the New Due Process, 47 IND. L.J. 467,

467 (2014); see also Areto A. Imoukhuede, The Fifth Freedom: The ConstitutionalDuty to
Provide Public Education, 22 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 45 (2011); JOHN DEWEY,
DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 4 (1916); Thomas Jefferson, Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge, in 2 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 414-26 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1904),
reprintedin EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 739-40 (Sol Cohen ed., 1974).
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The purpose of this Article is not to provide specific curricular recommendations to guide the future of public education. 190 Rather, this Article has attempted to define a new vision of positive education federalism-one that is rooted in a historical understanding of the constitutional
obligation of the federal government to shape education policy goals in a
manner that responds to unrelenting racial and class disparities. A few
core principles regarding the substantive dimension of positive education
federalism can be gleaned from this discussion:
1. First Principle: Providing an equal public education is a
federal responsibility that cannot be transferred to or assumed
by private market forces.
The overarching conclusion of this Article is that ESSA, NCLB, and
RTT unconstitutionally transfer federal responsibility for positively eliminating racial and class inequality in public education to private market
forces under the auspices of competitive federalism.191 This reading of
the federal role in public education is ahistorical and undermines the core
principles of equality informing Brown-era education federalism. 192
2. Second Principle: Positive federal action is justifiable in
public education when necessary to rectify historical patterns of
racial and class oppression.
It follows from the first principle that positive federal intervention in
public education is justified when employed to directly respond to our
unbroken history of racial and class disparities in educational outcomes.
The original vision of the ESEA and Brown anticipated future positive
efforts by the federal government to wield its block grant powers to actively dismantle old systems of oppression.1 93 The current statutory
framework has abandoned this vision of equality in its misguided pursuit
to harness the market forces of consumer choice, accountability, and competition to limit the federal role in education.1 94

190. See, e.g., RAVITCH, supra note 112; see, e.g., RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR, supra note
120; Kay Brilliant, NEA's Response to Race to the Top, NAT'L EDUC. Ass'N (Aug. 21, 2008),
available at http:// www.nea.org/home/35447.htm.
191. See supra Part III.
192. See supra Part III.
193. See supra Part II.
194. See supra Part III.
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must
3.
Third Principle: Our education federalism
acknowledge that racial discrimination and class oppression are
the true roots of current educational disparities.
Third, it is of the utmost importance that our education federalism
fully acknowledge the historical and continuing causes of education disparities: racial discrimination and poverty. 195 The race and class-based
roots of educational inequality are well-known and well-documented, and
our education federalism can no longer hide behind the veil of ignorance
provided by ESSA, NCLB, and RTT.196 Far from acknowledging the reality of educational disparities, our current competitive federalist framework for education actively attempts to conceal these roots, with the specious promise that the free market principles of choice, accountability,
and competition will eventually equalize education. 197 Modeling our education federalism around such race and class "neutral" market principles
have led to a deepening of the crisis while allowing society to ignore the
ways in which privilege shapes outcomes. 1 98
4. Fourth Principle: Our education federalism must strive to
promote racial and class integration.
Finally, any equality-based vision of education federalism must promote the social integration of our public schools. The current competitive
conception of education policy has failed those "faces at the bottom of
[the] well"199 and led to a rampant racial re-segregation of our schools. 200
This failure evinces a lack of faith and duty in fulfilling the original integrationist goals of Brown and the ESEA. Therefore, a positive theory of
education federalism must promote federal efforts to integrate our public
schools.
These core principles, on a theory of positive education federalism, can
be used to inform future reauthorizations of the ESEA. While this Article
does not attempt to advance specific changes in statutory law, it has attempted to redefine the substantive dimension of our education federalism in a manner that restores our faith in Brown, the ESEA, and the
promise of racial and class equality.

195.
196.
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199.
200.

See supra Part II.
See supra Part II & Part III.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part III.
See Bell, supranote 3.
See supra Part III.
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CONCLUSION

The neoliberal vision of education federalism embodied by ESSA,
NCLB, and RTT has improperly shifted the federal government's role in
public education from one of promoting desegregation and social equality
to one of promoting market efficiency through the artifices of competition,
choice, and accountability. This deflection of moral responsibility for
class and racial inequality is tied to a larger process of post-racialism and
"post-oppression," whereby seemingly "neutral" market solutions are
seen as sufficient to promote equality in a liberal democracy. There is,
after all, a comforting allure to believing that social inequality is nonsystemic, and thus avoiding the cognitive dissonance (and structural upheaval) that comes from confronting our continuing legacy of racial and
class privilege.
Allowing the "invisible hand" of the market to sort educational outcomes under the guise of "competition," "choice," and "accountability,"
however, has led to a deepening of the crisis confronting our public
schools. The federal role in public education has been reduced to incentivizing reform centered around market principles, rather than promoting desegregation and the equality envisioned by Brown and the original
ESEA. "Our federalism" demands more than this. The substantive dimension of education federalism, as constitutionalized by Brown and
framed by the original ESEA, must be restored in our public education
policy. The adoption of a positive conception of the federal role in public
education to frame future policy discussions can put us once again on the
path towards achieving equality of educational outcome for all students.
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